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REPLY OF PROFESSOR DAVID RUDOVSKY TO
PROFESSOR STEPHEN I. VLADECK, “THE FIELD
THEORY: MARTIAL LAW, THE SUSPENSION POWER,
AND THE INSURRECTION ACT”
David Rudovsky∗
Professor Vladeck’s article addresses from an historical and constitutional
perspective the question of whether Congress may indirectly grant to the
President the authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus by enacting
legislation that permits the President to impose martial law.1 Under this theory,
even if the Constitution vests Congress, and not the President, with the sole
authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, contingent legislation regarding
martial law would be viewed as congressional action enabling the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the President can validly determine
that habeas jurisdiction is inconsistent with a declaration of martial law.
In an intriguing analysis, Professor Vladeck suggests that President Lincoln
may have properly suspended habeas corpus in Baltimore in 1861, not for the
reasons he gave at the time, but because he properly imposed martial law in
Baltimore.2 Ultimately, I reject that thesis on constitutional and prudential
grounds. As I will explain, martial law is not always inconsistent with habeas
corpus. Moreover, given the strong constitutional argument that only Congress
can suspend the writ of habeas corpus, to permit the suspension by the President
upon the imposition of martial law, without concurrent action by Congress,
would present very grave dangers to civil liberties.
To understand my position fully, it is first necessary to broaden the
discussion of habeas corpus and the history of civil liberties in wartime in the
United States. As an historical matter, in times of war or perceived dangers to
national security, the dangers to civil liberties are greatest. When we look back at
American wars, both hot and cold, we find a consistent pattern of imposing
unnecessary restrictions on civil liberties.3 In each instance there was wide
∗ David Rudovsky is a Senior Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and a founding
partner of Kairys, Rudovsky, Messing & Feinberg, LLP.
1. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Field Theory: Martial Law, the Suspension Power, and the
Insurrection Act, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 391 (2007).
2. Id. at 430. President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus on several occasions during
the American Civil War, and thousands of persons were arrested without judicial proceedings.
GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES 124 (2004). In Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), the
Supreme Court ruled that Lincoln exceeded his constitutional authority by his suspension of habeas
corpus, even in a time of civil war, where the civil courts were functioning. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
at 127.
3. See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 27-29 (1941)
(describing circumstances leading to Alien and Sedition Acts passed in late eighteenth century); PAUL
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support for the limitations at the time that they were imposed, and in each, years
later, there was historical, judicial, or governmental acknowledgment that the
restrictions were both unjustified and damaging to the country.4
At the very beginning of our constitutional history, just a few years after the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment met its first significant
challenge. In 1798, the French and English were at war, and in the United States,
the Federalists favored the English, and the Republicans supported the French.5
President John Adams, a Federalist, moved the United States into a state of
undeclared war with France.6
The Federalists sought to undermine Republican resistance to this policy by
enacting the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. Under the Alien (or Alien
Friends) Act, the President could deport any noncitizen deemed to be dangerous
to the peace and safety of the United States.7 The Act provided no right to a
hearing, no right to present evidence, and no right to judicial review.8
The Sedition Act prohibited criticism of the government, the Congress, or
the President with the intent to bring them “into contempt or disrepute.”9 It is
difficult to imagine a broader assault on basic First Amendment principles, yet
the government successfully prosecuted Republican newspapers and opponents
of the Adams administration for engaging in speech critical of the government.10
Indeed, the very first prosecution under the Act was of Matthew Lyon, an
outspoken Republican congressman from Vermont.11 Such speech would be fully
protected under current interpretations of the First Amendment.12 Fortunately,
these acts expired with the election of President Jefferson, who pardoned all
convicted parties.13 Nevertheless, the precedent of overbroad restrictions on
speech had been set and future wars were likely to bring similar repressive acts.
The Civil War presented another great challenge to the constitutional
framework when President Lincoln claimed the power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus as a means of furthering the war effort. This exercise of executive
power was based on compelling exigencies but, as Professor Vladeck has
MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 71-86 (1979)
(describing passage of laws restricting civil liberties in wake of World War I).
4. See, e.g., Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 2, 102 Stat. 903, 903-04 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989a (2000)) (expressing apology from Congress “on behalf of the
Nation” for internment of Japanese American citizens during World War II).
5. STONE, supra note 2, at 25-26.
6. JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 5-8 (emended ed. 2d prtg. 1967).
7. Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, § 2, 1 Stat. 570, 570-71 (1798) (expired 1800).
8. Id.
9. Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 73, § 2, 1 Stat. 596, 596 (expired 1801).
10. STONE, supra note 2, at 46-58, 63.
11. Id. at 48-54.
12. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (acknowledging consensus regarding
Sedition Act as inconsistent with First Amendment); JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE
ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS 166-67 (1951) (illustrating incongruity of First Amendment and Sedition
Act).
13. STONE, supra note 2, at 73.
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demonstrated, was highly controversial.14
As the United States entered World War I, dissent to the war effort brought
severe condemnation from the Wilson administration.15 Congress soon enacted
the Espionage Act of 1917,16 which became a centerpiece of the government’s
effort to criminalize dissent.17 The government prosecuted more than 2000
dissenters for expressing opposition to the war or the draft, with many
defendants receiving severe prison sentences.18
In 1918, Congress enacted the Sedition Act, which made it a crime to
publish any disloyal or abusive language intended to cause contempt or scorn for
the government, the Constitution, or the flag of the United States.19 In a series of
decisions in 1919 and 1920, the Supreme Court upheld the convictions of
individuals who simply expressed their opposition to the war, including Eugene
Debs, who had received almost one million votes in 1912 as the Socialist Party
candidate for President.20 With the end of hostilities, the repressive acts were
reconsidered. In 1921, Congress repealed the Sedition Act and all those
convicted under it were released from prison.21 Further, as with the original
Alien and Sedition Acts, the Supreme Court later made clear that its decisions of
this era were not in line with the First Amendment.22
Immediately following World War I, in the wake of the Russian Revolution,
a series of violent strikes and bombings triggered the period known as the “Red
Scare” of 1919-20. To combat a new enemy, “radical” dissidents (mainly
immigrants), Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer established the “General
Intelligence Division” (“GID”) within the Bureau of Investigation.23 J. Edgar
Hoover was put in charge of intelligence gathering, and using law enforcement
efforts that bear a strong resemblance to those initiated by Attorney General
Ashcroft following 9/11, the GID conducted a series of raids and arrested more

14. See generally Vladeck, supra note 1, at 397-415 (discussing context of President Lincoln’s
suspension of writ and chronicling historical and continuing controversy over propriety of his actions).
15. DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 21-26
(1980); see also STONE, supra note 2, at 137-38 (describing President Wilson’s resistance to criticism of
war effort); Woodrow Wilson, Address of the President of the United States on the State of the Union
(Dec. 7, 1915), in 53 CONG. REC. 95, 99 (1915) (urging Congress to take active measures to ensure
disloyalty to war effort is “crushed out”).
16. Pub. L. No. 65-24, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217, 217-18.
17. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the Espionage Act of 1917: A Mystery
Unraveled, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 335-36 (2002) (discussing original objectives of Espionage Act).
18. See CHAFEE, supra note 3, at 51-52 n.30 (tallying number of Espionage Act convictions,
pardons, and commutations reported).
19. Sedition Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-150, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553, 553-54 (repealed 1921).
20. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216
(1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 47-48 (1919).
21. STONE, supra note 2, at 230-32.
22. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (overruling previous conviction
under Sedition Act, citing conflict between Act and First and Fourteenth Amendments); see also
MURPHY, supra note 3, at 268-70 (describing Justice Brandeis’s civil liberties concerns and subsequent
embrace of those concerns by Court majority).
23. STONE, supra note 2, at 222-23.
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than 4000 people on suspicion of radicalism.24 Many were physically abused, and
many were illegally deported.25
A group of distinguished lawyers and law professors published a report on
the activities of the Department of Justice during this period which carefully
documented its excesses.26 In a separate report, Charles Evans Hughes described
the governmental abuses as follows:
We have seen the war powers, which are essential to the
preservation of the nation in time of war, exercised broadly after the
military exigency has passed . . . and we may well wonder in view of the
precedents now established whether constitutional government as
heretofore maintained in this republic could survive another great war
even victoriously waged.27
World War II brought one of the most shameful episodes in our
constitutional history. In 1942, 120,000 Japanese Americans were placed in
internment camps by executive order28 notwithstanding the utter lack of
evidence that persons of Japanese descent posed any risk to national security.29
No charges were brought and there were no hearings to determine if any of
those ordered to be interned were disloyal or posed any risk to the war effort.30
In Korematsu v. United States,31 the Supreme Court upheld the President’s
action,32 and in Hirabayashi v. United States,33 the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a related curfew order.34 In an opinion that disingenuously
denied the role of race, the Court ruled:
[W]e are not unmindful of the hardships imposed . . . upon a large
group of American citizens. But hardships are part of war, and war is
an aggregation of hardships.
....
. . . Korematsu was not excluded from the [West Coast] because of
hostility to . . . his race . . . [but] because the . . . military authorities . . .
decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all
24. Id. at 223-24.
25. See id. (describing systematic targeting and deporting of suspected dissidents).
26. See generally NAT’L POPULAR GOV’T LEAGUE, TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: REPORT UPON
THE ILLEGAL PRACTICES OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1920) (documenting
instances of illegal government action).
27. Charles Evans Hughes, Address at Harvard Law School (June 21, 1920), excerpted in
CHAFEE, supra note 3, at 102.
28. See Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942) (authorizing establishment of
“military areas” ostensibly to protect nation against espionage and sabotage).
29. See David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention: Another View, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 59, 94 (2006) (summarizing unwarranted internment of Japanese Americans).
30. See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 58-63 (1983) (describing decision-making process that led
to forced internment, including recognition that Japanese Americans engaged in no known sabotage
prior to internment order).
31. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
32. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 224.
33. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
34. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 105.
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citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the [area] . . . . We
cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—
now say that at that time these actions were unjustified.35
In Ex parte Endo,36 the Court ruled that the detention of persons who might
be subject to relocation was unconstitutional.37 While this case limited
presidential powers, the Court did not issue the opinion until President
Roosevelt ordered the release of those interned.38 Once again, the Supreme
Court deferred to presidential claims of national security and only reconsidered
after the President was willing to forgo the continued use of internment powers.
The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians
concluded that the factors that shaped the internment decision “were race
prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership,” rather than military
necessity.39 Shortly thereafter, federal courts vacated the convictions in the
Korematsu40 and Hirabayashi41 cases. The courts found that at the time of the
internment decision, government officials not only knew that there was no
military necessity but had intentionally deceived the Court regarding the
supposed risks posed by Japanese Americans on the West Coast.42 In 1988,
President Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which officially declared
the Japanese internment a “grave injustice” that had been “carried out without
adequate security reasons” and offered reparations to each formerly interned
Japanese American along with a formal presidential apology for the
discrimination, loss of liberty, loss of property, and personal humiliation they
had suffered.43
Following World War II, as the nation moved into the Cold War,
anticommunism swept the nation and generated a wide range of restrictions on
free expression and free association, including extensive loyalty programs for
government employees, emergency detention plans for alleged “subversives,”
legislative investigations designed to punish by exposure, public and private
blacklists of those who had been “exposed,” and criminal prosecutions of the
leaders and members of the Communist Party of the United States.44 In Dennis
35. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219, 223-24 (citation omitted).
36. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
37. Endo, 323 U.S. at 302.
38. See IRONS, supra note 30, at 344-45 (discussing interplay between Court’s publication of Endo
opinion and government’s release of persons from internment).
39. COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION & INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE
DENIED 18 (1982).
40. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
41. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 1987).
42. See id. at 597-98 (discussing suppression of government report that provided basis for
exclusionary orders unrelated to military exigency); Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1417 (detailing
revisions made by government to reports on internment prior to submission to Supreme Court); see
also IRONS, supra note 30, at 206-18, 278-307 (describing deceptions by government officials to justify
internment plan).
43. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 2, 102 Stat. 903, 903-04 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989a (2000)).
44. See generally RALPH S. BROWN, JR., LOYALTY AND SECURITY: EMPLOYMENT TESTS IN THE
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v. United States,45 the Court upheld the Smith Act and ruled that the leaders of
the American Communist Party could be punished for their speech under a
highly questionable application of the standard of “clear and present danger.”46
Over the next several years, the Court upheld legislative investigations of
“subversive” organizations and individuals and the exclusion of members of the
Communist Party from the bar, the ballot, and public employment.47 During the
same period, as the “Red Scare” diminished, the Court began the process of
limiting the earlier decisions restricting First Amendment rights.48
Professor Martin Lederman stated that in times of war, there is silence of
the laws.49 Attorney General Biddle, who was the attorney general during World
War II put it a different way: “[T]he Constitution has never greatly bothered any
wartime President.”50 I think our current attorney general would probably say
the same thing and, further, that it is a good thing that the laws do remain silent.
Thus, it is not surprising that in the war on terrorism we have seen a replay
of governmental manipulation of national security to justify significant
limitations on constitutional rights. Within months of 9/11, the Department of
Justice detained thousands of alleged immigration violators, based solely on their
ethnicity, and subjected them to cruel and unconstitutional conditions of
confinement.51 Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy ordered his judges to
“close immigration proceedings to the press and public . . . in certain ‘special
interest’ cases.”52 Congress passed the Patriot Act53 that gave federal law
UNITED STATES (1958) (discussing use of loyalty tests to suppress and ferret out communist activity
among government employees); FRANK J. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE: THE AIMS AND
METHODS OF AMERICA’S POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM (1980) (discussing methods of targeting
and exposing suspected political subversives in attempt to suppress communist activities); STONE,
supra note 2, at 312-14 (describing anticommunism initiatives and sentiment).
45. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
46. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 516-17.
47. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 115 (1961)
(affirming Board’s classification of “Communist Party” as “Communist-action organization”);
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959) (affirming conviction of professor who refused to
answer questions regarding his involvement in Communist Party).
48. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 320 (1957) (limiting previous decision in Dennis
to advocacy of forcible overthrow of government, rather than advocacy of abstract doctrine).
49. Martin S. Lederman, Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown Univ., Keynote Address at the
Temple Law Review Symposium: Executive Power: Exploring the Limits of Article II (Mar. 23, 2007).
The same challenges to constitutional rights exist even in “metaphorical” wars. Thus, in the war on
drugs, the courts have severely compromised the protections of the Fourth Amendment. David
Rudovsky, The Impact of the War on Drugs on Procedural Fairness and Racial Equality, 1994 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 237, 240.
50. FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 219 (1962).
51. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 2 (2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf (detailing conditions in which detainees were held).
52. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 941 (E.D. Mich. 2002). The circuit courts
ultimately divided on the issue. Compare N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 20405 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding no right of access for press to attend deportation hearings), with Detroit
Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 711 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court’s finding of First
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enforcement vast new surveillance powers, including the authority to secure a
wide range of personal and political materials without the normal showing of
probable cause and a search warrant.54 The President also claimed unilateral
power to declare persons as “enemy combatants” and thereby relegate them to
indefinite detention without due process.55
Six years later, the scope of the limits on civil liberties is stunning. While the
full range of counterterrorism tactics may not be known for years, the
constitutional violations already exceed those of previous wars. Thus, we
continue to hold “enemy combatants” in the confines of Guantánamo under a
regime in which the laws and Constitution, to say nothing of the Geneva
Conventions, do not apply;56 the President has used the National Security
Agency (“NSA”) to conduct electronic surveillance of large numbers of persons
without court approval on vague allegations of terrorist activities;57 the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) has issued thousands of “national security
letters” for private and personal information, again without any court approval
or supervision;58 the “state secrets” doctrine is regularly invoked to bar claims of
torture and other serious constitutional violations;59 and, notwithstanding the
continued official line that we do not torture, the opposite is most decidedly
true.60

Amendment right of access to deportation proceedings).
53. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in
scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (renewed 2006).
54. Id.; see also Susan N. Herman, The USA PATRIOT Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth
Amendment, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 67, 73-75 (2006) (explaining that no probable cause is
required for government intrusion).
55. Neil Kinkopf, The State Secrets Problem: Can Congress Fix It?, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 489, 493
(2007); Mark C. Rahdert, Double-Checking Executive Emergency Power: Lessons from Hamdi and
Hamdan, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 471 (2007).
56. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that federal courts have
no jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by detained enemy combatants), cert. granted, 127 S.
Ct. 3078 (2007).
57. See ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (granting injunction for
plaintiffs whose businesses were harmed by government monitoring of international communication
without warrants), vacated, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding plaintiffs lacked standing).
58. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS, at xix (2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0703b/final.pdf (estimating more than 56,000 national security letter
(“NSL”) requests in 2004); Barton Gellman, The FBI’s Secret Scrutiny, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at
A1 (estimating 30,000 NSLs per year).
59. See, e.g., Kinkopf, supra note 55, at 493 (describing President’s assertion of state secrets
privilege in case challenging indefinite detention of enemy combatants); D.A. Jeremy Telman, Our
Very Privileged Executive: Why the Judiciary Can (and Should) Fix the State Secrets Privilege, 80 TEMP.
L. REV. 499, 500-01 (2007) (calling for judicial reconsideration of “state secrets” privilege and its
foundations because of its immunization of parties accused of statutory, constitutional, and human
rights violations).
60. See Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on
Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278, 279 (2003) (examining accounts of physical
abuse following September 11, 2001 attacks and during occupation of Iraq); Raymond Bonner, The
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This historical perspective is necessary background to the fundamental
questions that Professor Vladeck and others have raised regarding suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus. Under what situations should we permit the
suspension of the writ? Is the President authorized to suspend the writ, or does
Congress have the sole authority in this area? Are other grants of power to the
President, and specifically the power to impose martial law, sufficient to
authorize suspension of the writ?
The Constitution recognizes the right of habeas corpus in a negative fashion
by stating that the writ of habeas corpus “shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”61 As the
Suspension Clause is part of Article I of the Constitution, which provides for the
powers of Congress, there has been fairly general consensus that the power of
suspension is limited to congressional action.62 But, as Professor Shapiro has
stated, “few clauses in the Constitution have proved so elusive.”63 I agree with
those scholars and courts that have taken the position that only Congress has the
power to suspend the writ,64 but beyond that issue there are other questions that
are equally significant.
First, there is the fundamental question of whether there may be judicial
review of suspension of habeas corpus. The Suspension Clause is specific as to
the conditions precedent for suspension, but the Court has never determined
whether one who is deprived of a habeas remedy may challenge the suspension
on grounds that there was not a “Rebellion” or “Invasion” that required
suspension? Does a court have any power of judicial review, or is that issue a
political question beyond the proper jurisdiction of the courts?65

CIA’s Secret Torture, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Jan. 11, 2007, at 28, 29 (reviewing STEPHEN GREY,
GHOST PLANE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE CIA TORTURE PROGRAM (2006); and COMM’N OF INQUIRY
INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE
EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR (2006), available at www.ararcommission.ca/eng/26.htm)
(examining historical precedent for and detailing recent cases of extraordinary rendition); Jane Mayer,
Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2005, at 106, 106-08 (describing extraordinary
rendition program of Bush administration); Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons,
WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A1 (reporting on covert U.S. prisons in undisclosed European locations);
ACLU, Torture Documents Released Under FOIA, http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/torturefoia.
html (last visited Jan. 6, 2008) (listing U.S. government reports and documents detailing prisoner
abuse).
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
62. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights,
and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2045 (2007); Trevor W. Morrison, Hamdi’s Habeas
Puzzle: Suspension as Authorization, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 428-30 (2006); Vladeck, supra note 1,
at 393 n.8.
63. Shapiro, supra note 29, at 59.
64. See, e.g., Rahdert, supra note 55, at 451 n.6 (2007) (noting that “[the] location [of the
language about the writ of habeas corpus] in Article I has led to the conclusion that it is Congress, as
opposed to the President” that wields power to suspend writ of habeas corpus). Notably, the Supreme
Court has also recognized Congress’s power to suspend the writ. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch)
75, 101 (1807).
65. See Shapiro, supra note 29, at 77-79 (noting that Supreme Court has never ruled on judicial
supervision of suspension); Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV.
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Suspension of habeas corpus also presents the important and difficult
question of the relationship between suspension of the remedy and the status of
the rights at stake.66 Habeas corpus is a remedy for the violation of substantive
rights to liberty and freedom; it cannot issue unless a constitutional deprivation is
proven. In the usual case, the petitioner alleges that she is illegally detained or is
subject to illegal treatment by the government, and the filing of the petition
provides a mechanism by which the court may inquire into the issue of custody.
But when there is a suspension of the writ, is the underlying “right” suspended as
well? Posed this way, habeas suspension raises the stakes beyond the limitations
on individual case remedies.67 If habeas corpus is suspended with respect to
detainees in Guantánamo, what does that say as to the “legality” of the
government’s policies? If habeas corpus is suspended, does the suspension also
terminate all other detention- or trial-related rights—for example, the right to a
fair trial, to be free from coercion, or physical abuse, or torture? Does
suspension of the writ also suspend any claim for an injunction or damages for
the unconstitutional confinement?
Given the serious questions over the scope and breadth of suspension, who
has the power to suspend, under what circumstances suspension is authorized,
and the scope of judicial review, there is even greater need to focus on the
question of whether we are willing to allow suspension by less than an explicit
act of Congress. The question discussed by Professor Vladeck is whether
Congress has authorized the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus by
legislation permitting imposition of martial law on the theory that martial law is
fundamentally inconsistent with the right of habeas corpus.68 Thus, under
Professor Vladeck’s analysis, Congress may authorize the suspension of the writ
on a conditional basis—the declaration of martial law by the President.
In my view, given the enormous consequences that attach to suspension, we
should not accept anything less than a timely and express congressional
authorization. It is simply too dangerous to permit Congress to allow for a
contingent set of events which in the sole view of the President is sufficient to
impose martial law and, by that action, to also suspend habeas corpus. Since the
President has the greatest incentive to suspend habeas corpus (as it relieves him
of justifying the detention or other treatment of detainees), Congress must
exercise the power on a noncontingent basis.
All of this is more than an academic question. As Professor Vladeck
demonstrates, the 2006 and 2007 amendments to the Insurrection Act
substantially broaden the circumstances under which the President may use
333, 335 (2006) (arguing that suspension should not be considered political question).
66. See David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted
Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1200-01 (discussing how limits on remedies such as federal
habeas relief may “erode” substantive rights). See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and
Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 908-09 (1999) (arguing against bright-line distinction
between remedies and constitutional rights).
67. Shapiro, supra note 29, at 81-85.
68. See generally Vladeck, supra note 1 (exploring relationship between imposition of martial law
and suspension of habeas corpus).
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military force in domestic situations to restore public order and enforce the laws
of the United States. The current law provides:
[W]hen, as a result of a natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious
public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other condition
in any State or possession of the United States, the President
determines that—
(i) domestic violence has occurred to such an extent that the
constituted authorities of the State or possession are incapable of
maintaining public order; and
(ii) such violence results in a condition described in paragraph (2);
or
[Second, the military can be called forth to] suppress, in a State, any
insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy if
such insurrection, violation, combination, or conspiracy results in a
condition described in paragraph (2).69
This Act provides a very broad authority on which to impose martial law.
The triggering conditions by their very nature do not necessarily implicate
“Cases of Rebellion or Invasion.”70 Accordingly, even if in theory there may be a
parallel between martial law and suspension of habeas corpus, under this statute
where martial law can be imposed in situations that do not present instances of
rebellion or invasion, there cannot be a legitimate suspension of habeas corpus.
The fundamental nature of habeas corpus should be preserved and
protected against suspension except in the most extreme circumstances. With the
inevitable pressure on civil liberties brought on by war and perceptions of
dangers to national security, we should be more protective of this fundamental
remedy for violation of basic rights. We ought to insist that any attempt to
suspend the writ be done in a way that is transparent and direct and puts political
accountability on those who would seek to limit liberty.

69. 10 U.S.C.A. § 333(a)(1)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 2007).
70. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (preventing suspension of habeas corpus except in specific
circumstances).

